Episode 3: The most wanted men in Indonesia

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Prologue: The LaBianca House

Joe Frost

“Oh I thought you were in the nightclub?”   

It’s one of the most common responses I get from people when the matter of my experience in Bali comes up.  

Generally, I steer clear of talking about it, although not through any sense of trauma.  

It’s just a lightning quick way ruin a conversation.  

But on those rare occasions that the right moment comes along with the right person, they often reveal they believed I survived the 2002 Bali Bombings.  

It’s not an unreasonable assumption – with 202 people killed in Paddy’s Pub and the Sari Club, it’s the deadliest attack in Indonesian history. The 88 Aussies who were murdered also make it the worst peacetime loss of life in Australian history.  

Just the size of the attack in Kuta made it statistically most likely to have been the Bali Bombing I survived.  

Then there’s the simple fact it’s a much better-known incident.   

October 12, 2002 produced scenes of bloodied people stumbling out of a blazing inferno, with dozens of others dead and dying in that same building.  

Something like that leaves an indelible mark on a nation.   

But when it happens for a second time - and at a much smaller scale? It’s just less memorable.   

Coming barely a year after 9/11, the nominal start of the War on Terror, the 2002 Bali bombing brought the previously concerning possibility that terrorism could hit at home into terrifying reality.  

Then, in 2003, Australians were killed in the bombing of the Jakarta Marriott. In 2004, the Australian Embassy in that same city was bombed.  

In fact, in the three years following the first Bali bombing, Australian civilians had been injured or killed in more than a dozen terror attacks in Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, India and the UK. 

By 2005, global terrorism was so prevalent in news and politics that I don’t think I was the only person who had started to tune it out. There was a public sense of terror fatigue.  

When considered like that, the reason most people think I survived Bali 2002 is because they don’t remember Bali 2005. We're the LaBianca House of terror in Bali.  

In academic circles, the 2005 attacks are referred to as Bali 2.  

It’s a sequel, it must be defined – at least in part – by the event that makes it No.2.   

There is also an undeniable logic to it being a sequel, given common characters played a key role in both events.  

And it made the story easy to summarise when questions of 'who the hell did this’ came up.  

“It was Jemaah Islamiyah, the group that did the first Bali Bombing.”  

That was the truth as it was understood in 2005. But in the years that have followed, so much more has come to light.  

Bali 2005 was part of a campaign of attacks carried out across the first decade of this century,  

Dozens of people played a part over those years, but the common thread was the leadership. 

Two men who had enough money, resources and training to oversee a series of bombings devastating and sophisticated enough to kill on a mass scale.  

Their names were Noordin Top and Azhari Husin. 

They would become the most wanted men in Ind onesia. 

And they had sworn an oath to Jemmah Islamiyah. 

But what does it mean to be a member of JI? Can you ever truly leave? If no one above you at JI gave the order to kill, who is responsible for what you do?  

In essence: when do your actions stop being those of your network and start being simply yours?  

The 2005 attack was planned by members of JI.  

But a JI attack? No, I don’t believe it was.  

Act 1: Military Academy of Mujahideen Afghanistan

Joe Frost

In the wake of Bali 1, the terrorists responsible gained a certain level of notoriety in Australia, with men like Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas gaining name recognition. 

Perhaps the name that became best well-known was Hambali – I suspect the main reason being that this Bali Bomber had the word ‘Bali’ in his name. 

But Hambali also loomed large in the Aussie consciousness because while Amrozi, Samudra and Mukhlas were all in police custody by the end of 2002, Hambali was more elusive.  

Eventually, he was caught.  

Today, Hambali is in Guantanamo Bay, where he has been held since 2006.  

A source told me Hambali is in good health, good spirits, eats well and exercises, and has dyed his hair and beard red using henna.  

What follows about Habmali is based on reporting in the media and legal documents that have been published over the past 20-plus years. However, while he is incarcerated, any allegations that Hambali has broken the law are just that – allegations.  

According to a US Department of Defense memo from 2008: 

Detainee is a member of al-Qaida and a senior member of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Detainee had associations with senior members of al-Qaida, facilitated al-Qaida operations, and is assessed to be responsible for multiple bombings in Southeast Asia. Detainee has acted as an operational planner in multiple terrorist attacks. Detainee has facilitated money, personnel, and supplies to al-Qaida and JI terrorist operations. Detainee’s life and personal actions reflect his commitment to the most extreme Islamic ideology. 

Hambali is not his real name.  

Born in West Java in 1961, Riduan Isamuddin moved to Malaysia in 1985 looking for work. Instead, he found Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir – two radical clerics in exile from Indonesia who together created JI. 

Easily recognisable with his long, white beard, Bakar Bashir gained notoriety in Australia in the 2000s as the spiritual leader of JI who was arrested for his role in Bali 1.  

He smiled a lot. Spent relatively little time behind bars.  

But for most of his adult life, Bakar Bashir was the junior partner.  

Abdullah Sungkar was a large man, with a loud voice. He was intelligent, charismatic and liked to laugh. 

The two first met in the 1950s, and by the 1970s they had created their own boarding school. Bakar Bashir was the teacher but Abdullah Sungkar was the headmaster.  

Bakar Bashir was co-founder of JI, but Sungkar was the inaugural Amir or spiritual leader.  

In 1985, Hambali spent six months studying at the feet of Sungkar and Bashir, before the young man was selected for further training.  

Throughout the 1980s, war was raging in Afghanistan, as Soviet forces faced off against a loosely-affiliated group of guerilla warriors who took up arms to defend their homes.  

The Afghan mujahideen. 

Over the years, the mujahideen's ranks swelled with Muslims from across the world who came to help their brothers repel the invading Communists.   

Steel sharpens steel, so Sungkar and Bashir began sending their young students to Afghanistan to train in an active theatre of war. 

What was the name of the military academy you were at – in Afghanistan? 

Nasir Abbas

Harby Pohantum Mujahidin Afghanistan – the meaning is military academy of mujahideen Afghanistan. 

Joe Frost

In 2003, Nasir Abbas was a high-ranking JI member who was arrested by the Indonesian police under suspicion of hiding the 2002 Bali Bombers.  

But in 1987, Nasir was just a teenage disciple of Sungkar and Bashir who had travelled to Afghanistan to attend the military academy.  

Nasir Abbas

So we learn everything. Such as small arm, up to the heavy weapon including the artillery – so all kinds of guns, ammunitions, explosives, everything about how to mixing the bomb to do the sabotage, make booby trap, how to fight tactical training – we learn everything in the three years. 

Joe Frost

And it was there, while training in the military academy, that Nasir first met Hambali. 

Nasir Abbas

I can tell that Hambali is quite smart person, even if he’s not the first ranked in the class, he is bright person, smart and also careful to the others...  

He has a nice word when he talk. When he talk to the others with Indonesian language, he has, what you say? A soft word that he use.  

People were impressed with him and get close to him. He’s kind to the others. 

Joe Frost

Hambali’s time in Afghanistan was relatively short – less than two years - although along with learning critical skills in combat and bombmaking, Hambali also first made contact with a lanky young Saudi from a billionaire family, who was making a name for himself: 

Nasir Abbas

In my time, when I was in Afghanistan in the ‘80s... we all know about Osama bin Laden and some of us have the chance to go to the camp of OBL.

OBL, of course, we know Afghanistan mujahidin also know he good donators, who helping financial, helping to make road and everything for construction for the mujahidin. 

Joe Frost 

While Hambali left Afghanistan in 1989, Nasir stayed on, graduating in 1990 and then spending three years as a weapons instructor at the academy. 

When Nasir returned to Malaysia, Sungkar and Bashir were no longer just his teachers – they were his superiors, having officially established JI in 1993.  

They were no longer sending  young men to Afghanistan but still needed a place outside Indonesia to train their recruits. 

Nasir Abbas

1994, my superior ordering me to go to Philippines, helping the Bangsa Moro people there, the separatists from the MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front. So late 1994, I start to set up a camp in the heart of the jungle in Mindanao together with the separatists there. 

Hambali who teach me the language of Philippines. Because in 1989, when he back from Afghanistan, he was ordered to go to Philippines, stay there and learn how the separatists are living – how they survive, how they choose the area of the camp.

So later in 1994, when Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir they ordering me to go to the Philippines, he is the one who teach me the language.  

Joe Frost 

Having established a training camp in the Philippines for JI, Sungkar and Bashir sent Nasir and Hambali to Myanmar. 

Nasir Abbas

The mission is to set up a camp in the land of Arakan to help the Rohingya people. So we went there – me and Hambali, only two person – we went there through Bangladesh, from the back door, we go pass through the Rohingya people in Arakan. When I observe the area, I met the people in the jungle, and I stay around a week. 

Joe Frost

It was decided that Myanmar was not the right situation for JI. But Sungkar and Bashir’s vision was expanding.  

Over the next few years, Nasir and Hambali both rose through the ranks to positions of leadership in JI, albeit in different geographical commands, known as Mantiqis. Hambali was head of Mantiqi 1, while Nasir was a leader of Mantiqi 3, and that separation gave them autonomy from one another in both their objectives and their actions. 

Since leaving Afghanistan in 1989, Hambali had continued to cultivate his relationship with Osama bin Laden. The US Department of Defense allege that in 1996 Hambali spent several days meeting with bin Laden in Afghanistan, where it was agreed that JI and al Qaida would form an alliance. 

For Hambali, this alliance meant more than just sharing intelligence and personnel – it meant following bin Laden’s grand vision for global violence. 

In 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwah, which included the passage: “to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim”. 

For clarity’s sake, Nasir Abbas refers to this as the 1999 fatwah, which could be when Hambali first brought it to JI – or a simple slip when remembering a detail from 25 years ago.  

Nasir Abbas 

1999, Hambali bring like what they call a fatwah from Osama bin Laden.

So when I read this statement, I tell to Hambali that I cannot accept this, because it’s against my knowledge and against the sharia. In Islam, whenever people do jihad – fighting in the battlefield – there’s a rule, we cannot kill civilians, we cannot targeting the women, children, the old men, we cannot destroy the holy place of the other religious intentionally.  

This is what – I never agree with Osama bin Laden and Hambali. And we have a small argument because he blame me not to believe Osama bin Laden, not to follow Osama bin Laden. And later, we never met. That is the last time, 1999, we met. 

Joe Frost

According to Nasir, the fatwah was not universally accepted by JI.  

In Mantiqui 3, Nasir told his members not to get involved.  

But in Mantiqi 1, members under Hambali’s command were allegedly encouraged to follow bin Laden’s orders and “kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military”.  

Nasir Abbas

It start in 2000, whenever Hambali and his colleague from JI who try to implement the statement of Osama bin Laden. You know in 2000 there’s more than 30 churches in all around Indonesia on Christmas Eve on 2000, have been terror by the bomb inside the church. 

Joe Frost

Islamic extremists bombing Christian churches on Christmas Eve sounds like a recipe for reprisals, revenge and retaliatory violence.  

That was the plan. 

But if he was going to target dozens of churches, Hambali needed a dedicated bombmaker – someone with an engineer’s understanding of explosives.  

He knew just the man.  

Act 2: Teachers and leaders 

Joe Frost

Azhari Husin’s childhood and early education could not have been more different from that of Nasir Abbas and Hambali. 

Where those two went from Malaysia to Afghanistan to train in an active warzone, as a teenager, Azhari was sent from his family home in Malaysia to the Australian city of Adelaide. 

Azhari arrived in ‘the City of Churches’ in the 1970s as a teenager, first as a high school student, before heading to the University of Adelaide to study engineering. 

David Craig 

He would drink, he would play soccer, he would socialise. He was just a fun guy and it, you know - an engineering student, they're all known for drinking, they're legendary.  

My name's David Craig. I have over 22 years of experience with the Australian Federal Police, predominantly in the areas of covert operations, counterintelligence, intelligence and counter terrorism. 

Joe Frost

David Craig spent a short but significant burst of his career trying to understand Azhari and ultimately bring him to justice. 

Because David Craig was a Detective Superintendent at the Australian Federal Police at the time of the 2005 Bali bombing.   

David Craig

I had an opportunity to act as the commander of counter terrorism. So I said, yeah, sure, I can do that. And I was supposed to start on the. Well, I think it was going to be the 2nd, the 2nd of October. 

But this bombing happened on the 1st and because the boss had already gone, everything was directed to me.  

Joe Frost

A previous episode quoted from ‘The Bali Project’, the 34-page document that was put together to plan the 2005 Bali Bombing in meticulous detail.  

Azhari was likely its primary author.  

But decades before he was one of the prime suspects in killing and maiming Aussies in the 2005 Bali bombing, Azhari had spent four years in Australia, where he embraced the local culture - perhaps a little too much. 

David Craig 

He, in his time there, was a fun-loving guy. 

He failed a lot of his subjects and his family weren't very happy with that. 

And he went back to Malaysia, where he must have borne a fair bit of shame with the family for not achieving what he should have.

Joe Frost

Azhari returned to Malaysia, where he pulled his head in enough to earn his degree. From there, he continued his education in the United Kingdom, studying at the University of Reading where he was awarded his PhD. 

When Dr Azhari Husin returned to Malaysia in the early 1990s, he did so a married man with a family, who had a good job at the University of Technology Malaysia.  

Life, however, was not without its complications.  

Azhari and his wife had struggled to conceive and lost a baby in the early stages of pregnancy. 

David Craig

This miscarriage and the difficulty in conceiving it all came to a head, then a few months later when he was in Jakarta and his wife got throat cancer ... it looked like she was going to die, so therefore he's still paying this price for all the wrongs that he'd done – this is what's been preached in his ear by Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, who in no small way influenced Azhari. 

Joe Frost

I suppose we'll never truly know exactly what caused him to be radicalised because life is a whole big pastiche of experiences.

David Craig

Yeah, that's right.

Yeah. Azhari was radicalised for a number of things, but once he was, there was no turning back.

And it's shows that there's a stereotype of Islamic suicide bombers, as all being poor, uneducated, manipulated people, but some of them – I'd say a fair majority – are not, that they are just simply very, very religious and they've been taught – from, that, this is in the Quran that this is what you must you must do... And if they believe that, if people are going to kill for the sake of God, in the name of God, and they have salvation and their family on Earth are going to be well looked after, and when they die they'll be looked after in the afterlife as well. It makes it, probably, a pretty attractive thing for someone that's very disenchanted with life.  

Joe Frost 

Azhari was not alone in finding faith in JI – one of his university students in Johor Baru was also a convert to the teachings of Sungkar and Bashir. 

His name was Noordin Mohammad Top. 

About a decade younger than Azhari, specific details about Noordin’s childhood and early education aren’t as well-known.  

We do know that by the mid-90s Noordin had graduated from university in his hometown of Johor Baru, where he had grown close to one of his lecturers, Azhari.  

We also know Noordin spent a brief period as an accountant, before taking on a leadership role at Luqmanal-Hakim - a school that had been established by Sungkar and Bashir, and was run by future Bali 1 leader Mukhlas. 

And we know that in 1997, Azhari and Noordin officially swore their allegiance to Sungkar and Bashir’s organisation.  

Because Nasir Abbas was there to see it – and to accept the two of them into his platoon. 

Nasir Abbas

On 1997, Noordin M Top and Azhari became members of JI. I am the witness that these people, some of the few people – including Noordin M Top and Azhari – say an oath to become JI members.  

Because I one of the leaders in Johor Bahru under Mukhlas, and then Mukhlas ask me to accept Noordin M Top and Azhari to become one of my... under my platoon, under my platoon.  

Joe Frost

The night of the 2005 Bali Bombings, David Craig began an intensive crash course in the life and crimes of Azhari and Noordin. He assessed the two as having completely different personalities – which made for complementary skillsets.  

David Craig

Yeah that’s right – Azhari wasn't a particularly likeable person, he was actually fairly quiet. Very, very intelligent, he'd been, you know, trained in in the Philippines and also Afghanistan. He certainly had a lot of credibility with his technical expertise. His bomb-making was particularly, you know, his strong suit. But interpersonal skills were fairly ordinary. 

Noordin Top was a very charismatic person. So the way he was able to recruit people for suicide bombings was quite remarkable. People liked him, he was a very likeable person.

He was charismatic, he was very personal, he was very good at selling the global fight for jihad, and cleansing yourself and manipulating these people. 

Joe Frost 

As their first commanding officer in JI, I asked Nasir what he thought of Noordin and Azhari as people.  

Nasir Abbas

Azhari is a lecturer. And Noordin M Top is a student. They both in the same university.  

But as a lecturer, Azhari is a lecturer, is a teacher, is not a leader. But Noordin M Top, even as a student, he's a leader.  

He’s the one who call people to join the Islamic study group, he’s the one who influence the lecturer and also the other student to join with the study group – so he lead.  

Joe Frost

Nasir was so impressed, he gave Noordin command of his 10 fellow new recruits, which included his former teacher, Azhari.  

Nasir Abbas

I feel comfortable and I feel satisfied when there were, Noordin lead these ten members in his group. And I found that he’s a good leader. 

But later on August 1997, my superior order me to go to Sandakan Sabah. So only a few months, they both be members under my command. Later on I do not know, so they under Hambali.

Joe Frost

Having moved from the leadership of Nasir to Hambali, Noordin and Azhari were first sent to a JI camp in the Philippines for a few weeks of training.  

Nasir Abbas

But later, 1999, Hambali send JI members to Kandahar, to al Qaeda. And he send Azhari to go to Afghanistan.  

Noordin M Top not go to Afghanistan, because he be the leader of Islamic boarding school in Johor Bahru – belong to JI, Luqmanal-Hakim the name of the school. 

So Azhari later get more knowledge about explosive mixing, chemicals and set up a bomb, a big bomb size, in Afghanistan in 1999...  

And then in 2000, they involved in the Christmas Eve bomb in Indonesia. 

Act 3: Christmas Eve 2000  

Joe Frost

Throughout the 1990s, Hambali continued to cultivate relationships with violent extremists across the globe, allegedly establishing himself as the most prominent and impactful terrorist in Southeast Asia.  

According to the UN Security Council, who refer to Hambali as Isamuddin: 

Isamuddin was ... considered JI’s director of operations, which oversaw JI’s financing, and served as the primary interface with Al-Qaida. He was Al-Qaida’s operations director for the Southeast Asia region.  

Isamuddin was involved in the 1995 “Operation Bojinka” plot to bomb 11 United States commercial airliners in Asia... 

Isamuddin was videotaped in a January 2000 Al-Qaida meeting with two of the 9/11 hijackers.  

Isamuddin helped several veterans who had just finished training in Karachi, Pakistan... to facilitate the USS Cole bombing.  

Joe Frost

These operations had global aims and impacts. However, on Christmas Eve 2000, Hambali allegedly brought his particular brand of terror home to Indonesia. 

On that day, across 11 different cities in Indonesia, approximately 50 bombs were placed in or near Christian churches. The precise number of devices is in dispute for reasons that will become clear. 

Ultimately, 18 people were killed and more than 100 were injured. 

In July 2003, as part of an Inquiry Into Australia's Relations with Indonesia, the Australian Federal Police described the Christmas Eve attacks as:  

“the first coordinated bombing operation undertaken by JI.  

“The attacks represented a significant change in the general strategy and tactics employed by JI since the migration of their leadership and operation base back to Indonesian in late 1990s.” 

Having spent some 15 years in Malaysia, Sungkar and Bashir had returned to Indonesia in  1999, following the fall of President Soeharto. 

It was to prove a brief return for Abdullah Sungkar, who died of cancer in October 1999. In his place, Abu Bakar Bashir stepped up to become the leader and Amir of JI. 

According to Nasir Abbas, what happened on Christmas Eve the following year was to prove a huge turning point – for JI, for Hambali and for terrorism in Indonesia. 

Nasir Abbas

It is not a JI operation. It is Hambali operation. And, because of the weakness of the Amir of JI, the weakness of Abu Bakar Bashir, to lead JI, he used by Hambali. It is opportunity for Hambali to do the operation and Abu Bakar Bashir cannot stop him.  

Joe Frost

I’ve spoken to people who said things may have been very different if Abdullah Sungkar had not passed away – that he was a stronger leader.  

Nasir Abbas

Exactly! Exactly! Exactly!  

JI was established on 1 January 1993. 1993, I graduate in 1990, Hambali graduate in 1989. So most of the leaders in JI, when it was established in 1993, most of them was graduated from the military academy of mujahedeen Afghanistan. Most of them knows how to use guns, ammunition, how to make a big bomb. The question is why is not happen any operation since 1993 until 2000? There is no operation. They not do any such operation against civilians – until the statement of Osama bin Laden on 1999. And Abdullah Sungkar pass away on 1999.  

Joe Frost

Nasir remembers the day he heard Abu Bakar Bashir had taken Abdullah Sungkar's place as head of JI. 

Nasir Abbas

I feel frustrated. I not hate Abu Bakar Bashir, I just feel uncomfortable because I know that he’s not a leader, he’s a teacher.   

You know that JI is a big group. The big group needs a leader. So the problems start when Abu Bakar Bashir be the Amir of JI.  

Joe Frost

With Bashir now in charge of JI, Nasir said Hambali felt he had the authority to enact – or a lack of authority to stop him from enacting – the violent upheaval that Bin Laden said was necessary. 

Nasir Abbas

Hambali change it. They agree to implement the statement of Osama bin Laden to do revenge. And they use some of the people in JI who know how to fight, who have experience in Afghanistan or in the Philippines, to implement the statement of Osama bin Laden. So that is the starting point why JI involved in the crime, in the terrorism action.  

Some of JI disagree with that, including me. 

Joe Frost

With Azhari recently returned from an al Qaeda masterclass in Afghanistan, Hambali had a highly skilled bomb-maker in his ranks to help ignite this upheaval. 

David Craig 

Azhari was of course behind the 47 bombings on Christmas Eve in churches which, you know, it's just such a callous and cowardly thing to do, to be attacking places of worship on their most significant night... 

Despite the death and mayhem, for Hambali and Azhari, the bombings were not a resounding success. 

Joe Frost

As a bomb-maker, Azhari had done a relatively shoddy job, with a large portion of his explosives failing, while at least two exploded while still in the hands of the perpetrators – killing two terrorists. 

David Craig 

Yeah, so some of the bombs didn't actually detonate and was because of humidity in Indonesia was so different to the dry environment in Afghanistan, where Azhari had practised his bomb-making skills and so about 50% of the bombs didn't detonate.

And what indicates to me is they can't have done too many practise runs – that they just didn't have the resources or they were pressed for time to get the bombings to happen. 

Joe Frost

It was to prove a vital lesson for Azhari – from then on, plastic containers would become a feature in his bombs, shielding the detonation device from the elements, regardless of how wet the weather. 

As for Hambali, the Christmas Eve attacks were a failure not just because half Azhari’s bombs failed to do their job, but because even the ones that worked did not achieve his aims. 

David Craig

Because that was meant to start a holy war, between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia, but the good thing was that the Christian community, as small as it is there, had already forgiven the bombers and the attackers almost immediately. And some of the more astute imams came out and said that they did not give the imprimatur for these bombings to happen – that it was Haram, that it should not have happened.  

And that, in fact, brought the Muslim community and the Christian community a lot closer together but infuriated people like JI because that's the exact opposite of what they wanted.  

It all melts away when it comes to good versus evil. And in that situation, I think that the Muslim and the Christian community did an outstanding job. 

Joe Frost

Christmas Eve 2000 was when Nasir’s understanding of JI shifted, causing concerns that cut to the core of his own faith.  

Nasir Abbas

Iin Islam, there’s a... obligation – obligation from every single Muslim. Perhaps you’ve heard these words, ‘amar ma'ruf nahi munkar' - the meaning is to ‘tell the good deeds and to prevent the bad deeds’.  

So this is an obligation for every single Muslim. So I am a Muslim. I know that what they did is not jihad. They bombed the churches, they bombed the civilians. It is not a good dead. It’s a bad deeds. So my obligation as a Muslim is to stop the bad deeds. 

So whenever I was being arrested and,  I say that I disagree with that and I always try to stop. So police say that if you want to stop, we also want to stop – it's a crime. 

So this is my reason why I agree to assist the police to stop the bad deeds. 

Joe Frost

For Nasir, there was a clear distinction between taking up arms against the Soviet army in Afghanistan, and bombing Christian civilians in church. 

And it was a distinction he believed would incur the wrath of a far higher power than  Indonesia’s police force. 

Nasir Abbas  

In our belief, when we make something wrong, God will angry. That is what we believe. So whenever they start to do the churches bombing on 2000 – I say that it’s wrong. God will get angry. It’s not jihad.  

Joe Frost

The Christmas Eve attacks had started a chain of events. In the decade to follow, hundreds of innocent people would be killed, with further hundreds more injured. 

Hambali’s part in it all would be brought to an end relatively shortly. But by the time he was in CIA custody, his proteges, Azhari and Noordin, were armed with the knowledge to create bombs and the authority to act without asking. 

The final piece in the puzzle for Azhari and Noordin was learning to convince young men to sacrifice their very lives. 

Young men like Salik Firdaus.